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Abstract
In his first paper, ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’, Stanley Cavell
defended the methods of ordinary language philosophy against various
charges made by his senior colleague, Benson Mates, under the influence
of the empirical semantics of Arne Naess.1 Cavell’s argument hinges on
the claim that native speakers are a source of evidence for ’what is said’ in
language and, accordingly, need not base their claims about ordinary
language upon evidence. In what follows, I maintain that this defence
against empirical semantics applies equally well to experimental
philosophy’s attack on doing philosophy from the armchair. In so doing,
I attempt to clarify – and adjust – Cavell’s claim that statements about
ordinary language are rule-descriptions that are neither analytic nor
synthetic.
I. Prologue
‘I don’t know what I could have meant by that. You say things some-
times, you don’t know what the hell you mean. But you’re sincere
when you say it’.
Bob Dylan
Stanley Cavell’s paper, ’Must We Mean What We Say?’, was first pre-
sented at the Pacific APA the year before its publication, practically
under coercion. In Cavell’s own words:
[I]n the spring of 1957, I was told that a panel on ordinary language
philosophy was being scheduled at the coming Christmas meetings of
the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, in
1. Naess (1938; 1949; 1957); cf. Mates (1958, esp. 73, n.12). The influence is briefly dis-
cussed by Cavell (2010:361), who describes how it ultimately led—with Mates’ help—to
the publication of his paper in Inquiry.
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which I would have a chance, let’s say an obligation, to defend in pub-
lic the views that I had been advancing all year concerning the ground-
breaking philosophical importance of the work of Austin, in the form
of a response to a paper to be presented by my senior colleague Benson
Mates.2
Philosophical works published that year (i.e. 1957) include G.E.M.
Anscombe’s monograph Intention, as well as J.L. Austin’s ’A Plea for
Excuses’, H.P. Grice’s ’Meaning’ and Gilbert Ryle’s ’The Theory of
Meaning’. Not a bad year for linguistic philosophy, then.3 Nevertheless,
work on the relation between meaning and speech was still in transi-
tion.4 On the one hand, Ryle had already distinguished usage from use,5
and Austin had begun lecturing on words and deeds. On the other hand,
Grice’s account of conversational implicature did not appear until 1961
(first formed as part of his defence of the causal theory of perception6),
and it is only after this and Austin’s 1955 lectures on How to Do Things
With Words, which were published posthumously in 1962, that people
began to talk of ’speech-acts’.7 While Wittgenstein had anticipated much
of this in the late 1940s, some of his most relevant remarks would not
be published until 1980:
What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we8 study the use [Geb-
rauch] of a word, point to mistakes in the description of this use and so
on? First and foremeost one asks oneself: How could that be so impor-
tant to us? It depends on whether what one calls a ‘wrong description’
is a description that does not accord with established usage [Sanktion-
iertem Sprachgebrauch9] – or one which does not accord with the practice
2. Cavell (2002:xix).
3. For a characterisation of linguistic philosophy and why it should not be conflated
with the philosophy of linguistics, see Vendler (1967:5ff.).
4. Cf. Laugier (2000:14).
5. Ryle (1953), discussed below.
6. Grice (1961); the view was subsequently developed in a number of papers reprinted
in Grice (1989).
7. See Sbisa (2011). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out that Mates (1958)
already refers to the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a way that is relevant for challeng-
ing the claims of OLP.
8. For who ‘we’ are for Wittgenstein, see Sandis (2019a).
9. While Anscombe translates ‘Sanktionierten Sprachgebrauch’ as ‘established usage’, Wittgen-
stein seems to be talking about established use, that is to say, usage that has in some way
been sanctioned. We may thus distinguish between the first time a speaker misuses ‘begs
the question’ to mean ‘raises the question’, the state of affairs in which the misuse has
become established usage, and the further state of affairs in which this established usage
has come to be sanctioned as correct use. The lattermost of these comes to obtain through
gradual change over time and not via some kind of official ceremony (although accep-
tance by institutions such as the OED are symbolic and constitute evidence). The source,
however, of such evidence for settling disagreements regarding the current status of any
expression is native speakers themselves.
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of the person giving the description [Praxis des Beschreibenden]. Only in
the second case does philosophical conflict arise.10
1957 was a peak year of kinds, whereafter people began to take more
seriously the worry that linguistic questions were ultimately empirical,
owing to which they needed to be tested as such, in order to be verified
or falsified accordingly.11 Naess thus challenged what he saw as the brute
appeal to personal ‘intuitions’ of those who practise so-called ordinary
language philosophy (OLP).12 This, in turn, inspired Mates to argue that
we should instead use empirical means to settle conceptual and linguistic
questions.13 Cavell sought to show that such criticisms are misplaced. In
what follows, I build on his arguments, showing thereby that they largely
stem from (i) what Ryle refers to as the ‘insidious’ conflation of ‘use’
and ‘usage’,14 and (ii) a basic misunderstanding of how appeals to ordi-
nary language work. On this account, fluent speakers do not have intu-
itions about what everyday words mean, any more than seasoned chess
players have intuitions about how the pieces move.
Mates proceeds by noting the disagreement between Ryle and Austin
on the meaning of the term ’voluntary’. The former claimed that the
word was typically reserved for cases in which someone did something
she should not have done15; the latter denied this normative dimension
in the very year in which Mates and Cavell had their debate.16 Was the
disagreement to be resolved empirically, by appeal to intuition, or in
some third way? In the paper to which Cavell was responding at the
APA, Mates writes:
10. RPP I, §548.
11. Hare (1957) would answer the question negatively, characterising philosophy as a
form of recollection that cannot be reduced to empirical discovery (cf. Sandis 2008: §2).
His position received friendly pushback from Henle (1957) and K€orner (1957).
12. Naess (1957). This attack on the use of ‘intuitions’ in OLP is revived by Jackman
(2005). Like Naess and Mates before him, Jackman’s arguments against conventionalism
are based on (i) sliding between ‘use’ and ‘usage’, and (ii) assuming that ‘conventionalism’
must appeal to either intuition or authority. But even descriptivists must allow for the
misuse of language. This leaves us with the question of how many people within a com-
munity must be engaged in the misuse of a term (and for how long) before this usage
occasions a common convention. There is, of course, no equation that can provide an
answer to it.
13. For Austin’s reaction to Naess, see Longworth (2018:13-14).
14. Ryle (1953: 321ff.). The conflation would be compounded by Grice’s influential
attempts to explicate sentence meaning in terms of speaker intentions (Grice 1989; see
also Grandy and Warner 2017: §4).
15. Ryle (1949:67).
16. Austin (1957:139).
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If agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sam-
ple as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the pro-
spects when the sample is enlarged?.17
Cavell, influenced by Austin’s lectures at Harvard,18 saw it as his job to
offer an analysis of the methods of Oxford linguistic philosophy that
were invulnerable to the sort of objections made by Naess and Mates,
whose views Nat Hansen nicely characterises as ’a mid-century version
of experimental philosophy that originated in Norway’.19 The debate
between them thus mirrors the contemporary debate between the
defenders of a priori conceptual analysis by appeal to intuitions about
thought experiments20 and the proponents of experimental philosophy,
with their rhetoric of burning the armchairs of the first group. Indeed,
there are lessons that participants of the current debate can learn from
the one that took place 60 years ago.
Cavell’s paper offers strong arguments against both sides, steering a
path in which OLP need not – and indeed should not – appeal to either
intuition or Gallup polls.21 He is here in surprising alliance with Alan
Turing. In the opening paragraphs of the article that introduced the
world to his famous ‘Turing Test’, he dismisses an important aspect of
linguistic philosophy:
If the meaning of the words “machine” and “think” are to be found
by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question “Can
machines think?” is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup
poll. But this is absurd.22
It is not obvious whether he has OLP or empirical semantics as his pri-
mary target. Quite possibly, Turing is rejecting what he takes to be a
shared preoccupation with ordinary language. Whatever his intentions,
Turing’s point works better against experimental philosophers interested
17. Mates (1958:65).
18. Cavell (2002:xix). In his autobiography, Cavell exclaims that ‘no intervention in phi-
losophy more clearly than Austin’s prompted an awareness of our apparent failures to
mean what we say’ (2010:360).
19. Hansen (2017: §1).
20. E.g. Jackson (1998).
21. Wittgenstein is conspicuous by his absence in all of this. One explanation is that
Cavell thought his understanding of Wittgenstein at the time was ‘primitive’ (2002:xix).
Cavell’s early work is, ironically, much closer to Wittgenstein’s way of thinking than later
work (e.g., Cavell 1979), in which his understanding is thought to be ‘less primitive’ and
Wittgenstein becomes an explicit focus. This transition (under the sceptical influence of
Thompson Clarke) is captured in Cavell (2010:362ff.). For criticism of Cavell’s later work,
see Moyal-Sharrock (2017, esp. chs.2-4).
22. Turing (1950:433). Cf. Williamson (2007:7).
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in usage than ‘armchair’ OLP philosophers who are preoccupied with
correct use.23
A Gallup poll can only tell us about usage, not use. That is to say, it
can only tell us how the majority of subjects questioned are using a term
or phrase (e.g., ‘novel’ or ‘beg the question’), not whether they are using
it correctly.24 As Ryle puts it:
A usage is a custom, practice, fashion or vogue. It can be local or
widespread, obsolete or current, rural or urban, vulgar or academic.
There cannot be a misusage anymore than there can be a miscustom or
a misvogue.25
If the rules governing linguistic use are normative, then the job of the
philosopher (as opposed to, say, the anthropologist) is to recall, describe,
and elucidate them.26
II. The Cavellian ‘Must’
While the rhetoric of Cavell’s response to Mates’ reaction to the debate
between Austin and Ryle has echoes of Turing, its content stands firmly
within OLP:
There is clearly a clash here. But is our only intelligent course at this
point to take a poll? Would it be dogmatic or unempirical of us to con-
clude simply that Ryle is wrong about this, that he has settled upon a
generalisation to which an obvious counterinstance has been pro-
duced?27
Cavell sides with Austin over Ryle in detail only. In allowing that Ryle
may have been onto something but simply overgeneralised, it could be
argued that he does not go far enough. Oswald Hanfling (2000:56ff)
argues persuasively that Cavell is wrong to maintain that ’when we ask
whether an action is voluntary we imply that the action is fishy’ (Cavell
2002:12), offering various instances – such as that of voluntary vs. con-
scripted service – where no fishiness is required (indeed, we need think
23. It is true that, while Austin writes of ‘“experimental” data’ (1966:274), he immedi-
ately makes it clear that such data are the explanada not the explanantia. For the view that
linguistic data may function as a tool for OLP, see Vendeer (1967:2-4; 32).
24. Of course, popular misuse over prolonged periods can give rise to a new or modified
use, but it does not do so automatically. Correct use is not a popularity contest.
25. Ryle (1953:321).Turing was alert to the relation of use to practice, correctly predict-
ing that ‘at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will
have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expect-
ing to be contradicted’ (Turing 1950:442).
26. Where appropriate, this job includes the noting of changes through time.
27. Cavell (2002:4).
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no further than the conceptual links to the word ’volunteer’). He is here
in rare agreement with Fodor and Katz, who note the irony of Cavell’s
own example of joining the army voluntarily counting against him, but
not the irony of their ably doing so from their own armchairs.28
Cavell’s paper is not about the concept of voluntariness but about the
method(s) of OLP.29 Still, the ‘fishiness’ debate raises general questions
regarding the relation of a word’s meaning to what we typically imply in
using it, hence the rhetorical (by implication) question of the paper’s
ambiguous titular question, which might be parsed in any one of the fol-
lowing ways:
(i)Must we mean what we say?
(ii)Must we mean what we say?
(iii)Must we mean what we say?
(iv)Must we mean what we say?
(v)Must we mean what we say?
(vi)Must we mean what we say?
Must Cavell have meant any one of the above at the exclusion of the
others? Does each new emphasis give rise to a different question and
answer? Finally, does the ’must’ in each question signify logical necessity
or a normative imperative? As Stanley Bates and Ted Cohen put it, ’ex-
plicating Cavell is no picnic’.30 On the one hand, Cavell is obviously
interested in how to understand the connection between the conven-
tional meaning of what is said and the pragmatic implicatures generated
through its being said in a certain context. On the other, he evinces a
surprising lack of interest in the ways in which we may intentionally use
euphemisms to not say what we mean.31 Nor is he concerned with cases
of misspeaking, including (but not limited to) the Freudian sense in
which we may slip into saying something other than what we intended to
say (whatever else we may have had in mind), which would give a nega-
tive answer to question (vi).
Cavell prescinds from telling us explicitly, but we can safely assume
that at least part of what he is interested in is whether, in saying that an
action is voluntary, I must mean that it is fishy; and, conversely, whether
I can mean that an action is fishy without (explicitly) saying so. The gist
of his argument seems to be that it is the job of OLP to elucidate
28. Fodor & Katz (1963:64). The U.S. Army (Signal Corps), who part-funded the work,
would have been relieved to read this.
29. See Hacker (1996) for why there is no single school of ordinary language philosophy.
For a reassessment of Austin’s method, see Sbisa (2009).
30. Bates and Cohen (1972). Cf. Vendler (1967:12ff.) with whose valiant attempt to ‘pare
away the trimmings of mysticism’ from Cavell’s account I am in sympathy.
31. See Holder (2013).
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concepts by uncovering implicit commitments. The point is weakened
by being made in the absence of Grice’s later system of conversational
implicatures, which would have enabled Cavell to distinguish it from
strict implication, employing the concepts of detachment and cancella-
tion.
Given that his main target is Naess’ and Mates’ criticisms of OLP,
Cavell’s question must be read as one regarding the role of OLP in
uncovering the meaning of what was said (iv), the reference of the high-
lighted word remaining itself ambiguous between the actual word(s) spo-
ken and what was said in giving it expression. In the former sense, the
question must, once again, be answered negatively; whereas in the latter,
the answer hangs on whether we are talking about what would come to
be called “speaker meaning,” by contrast with “expression meaning.”
Cavell argues that Mates’ reaction is much too rash and drastic. All
that has happened is that a philosopher contemplating correct usage has
(perhaps in the grip of a certain picture) neglected to recall one or more
uses of a term or phrase. Indeed, Hanfling’s own correction of Cavell’s
’fishiness’ constraint continues along the same lines, thereby adding cre-
dence to the latter’s underlying point about OLP. A philosopher of any
stripe who offers an account of a concept may be corrected by the sim-
plest and most powerful of OLP methods: recollecting the variety of
ways in which we use any given term, and reaching appropriate conclu-
sions about the concept(s) it expresses. This point can be stated simply
enough. But Cavell has 40 more pages to go.
His aim is to demonstrate that it is a mistake to think that we typically
need to appeal to evidence to know what ’we’32 mean by the things we
say. Evidence is something the anthropologist or linguistic tourist might
seek when trying to understand a foreign expression. Still, it is not the
normal way of the ’native’ speaker.33 As Ryle puts it: ‘Mrs Beaton tells
us how to make omelets; but she gives us no information about Parisian
chefs’.34 Equally, the native speaker tells us how to use words, without
giving us information about local speakers.
Why so? One may think it sufficient to reply that being a native
speaker already entails a certain mastery of a language. When we learn a
new language as native speakers, we do not do so by means of evidence
but through an initiation into norm-governed practices.35 These are not
claims that Cavell disputes. He nevertheless wants to go further, putting
32. See Sandis (2019a); cf. Vallee (1996) and Levy (2013).
33. Nor of the fluent speaker, though fluent speakers are not (as a group) as straightfor-
ward a source of evidence as native speakers.
34. Ryle (1953:322).
35. This much has to be true, no matter what one makes of the poverty of the stimulus
argument.
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forth the positive thesis that native speakers are a source of evidence for
what is said in their language:
[Native] speakers do not, in general, need evidence for what is said in
the language; they are the source of such evidence.36
of evidence for what is said in their language:
In what sense can a native speaker be a source of evidence if she is
liable to being corrected by examples of correct use that conflict with
her analysis? Do counter-linguistic instances not function as evidence
against the original analysis offered? In a sense, yes. But Cavell uses the
plural (’native speakers’). When an individual native speaker fails to
notice difference or similarity in linguistic usage, the evidence that tells
against her analysis is proffered by other native speakers. The important
point is that the evidence does not lie outside of the community of
native speakers in such a way that would allow for a foreign ethnogra-
pher to amass it and thus prove that all native speakers were mistaken.37
III. Fishy Rules
When the anthropologist, ethnographer or tourist attempts to find out
what the ’natives’ mean by the words they use, their speech is the data,
viz. the source of evidence. The norms of language do not exist inde-
pendently of its native speakers. Through their linguistic behaviour,
speakers not only follow the norms they have learned, they also (con-
sciously or otherwise) alter them and create new ones, as older uses of
words become obsolete, and new uses – alongside entirely new words –
come into existence.38 What, then, are these rules of grammar that we
cannot break willy-nilly but we can nonetheless come to overturn and
put behind us? Cavell attempts to answer the question by considering
the logical form of statements such as:
S: “When we ask whether an action is voluntary we imply that the
action is fishy.”39
He writes:
When I am impressed with the necessity of statements like S, I am
tempted to say that they are categorial [. . .] Statements about ordinary
36. Cavell (2002:4); cf. Hare (1957 & Hare 1960).
37. Cavell’s suggestion here anticipates later debates about whether one can follow a rule
in isolation from a community of speakers (e.g., Baker & Hacker 1990 vs. Malcolm
1989).
38. Cf. Rundle, 1979:283-9).
39. Cavell (2002:12).
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language. . . are not analytic, and they are not [. . .] synthetic [. . .] Nor
do we know whether to say they are a priori [. . .] there is no way to
classify such statements; we do not yet know what they are.40
Hanfling’s criticism (see §2), however, suggests that it is simply false that
one typically implies anything about the fishiness of an action by saying
that it was voluntary or involuntary. We are thus being presented with a
false statement masquerading as the kind of statement whose ’necessity’
Cavell is struggling to explain. If the statement is false, then it would
seem to be synthetic. Are all statements like S truth-apt? It would be
premature to say so without hearing what Cavell has to say about them,
and without prejudice. So, let us put Hanfling’s particular objections
aside for now and focus instead on the general point that Cavell is trying
to make. This involves the introduction of what he alternately calls ’cate-
gorial declaratives’ and ‘rule-descriptions’. Cavell claims that the employ-
ment of such declaratives reminds us that the ‘pragmatic implications’ of
our utterances must be meant, because ‘they are an essential part of what
we mean when we say something, of what it is to mean something’ and
‘what we mean (intend) to say, like what we mean (intend) to do, is
something we are responsible for’.41
As it stands, the claim is unconvincing for two distinct reasons. First,
we can be held responsible for things that we did not intend. Second,
we must contend with Grice’s (later) distinction between strict implica-
tion and implicatures that are cancellable; a distinction that could have
been phrased in terms of essential and inessential parts of what we mean
when we say things, such as ’she did it voluntarily’ or ’his handwriting is
excellent’. In cancelling an implicature (e.g. that the candidate’s work
was poor) we acknowledge its presence while signalling that we did not
intend it. In this straightforward sense, it simply is not true that we must
mean what we say, viz. that the pragmatic implications of our utterances
must be meant. But in another, less direct sense, Cavell’s point remains at
least partly untouched by Grice. For in order to say certain things in cer-
tain contexts,42 we must intend their strict implications and at least be
aware of the conversational ones – even when we are prone to can-
celling them.
40. Ibid.:13-16.Cf. Toulmin (1949), who offers a pre-Sellarsian defence of ‘synthetic nec-
essary truth’.
41. Cavell (2002:30-32).
42. Cavell, like Ryle, is insufficiently sensitive to context when discussing what we must
mean by the things we say. This suggests that he has sentence meaning (as opposed to
speaker meaning) in mind. But there is space for a third alternative: expression meaning,
viz. the social meaning that an utterance has in a very particular context (e.g., one of
dog-whistling).
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One decade later, Cavell transposed his question to art, concluding
that ‘[i]ntention [. . .] is a way of understanding the thing done, of
describing what happens’.43 His stark conclusion is that whether or not
someone intended to do something ‘depends on what he did, on the
work itself’.44 I have argued elsewhere that it is a mistake to conflate
one’s deeds with one’s doing of it.45 A similar conflation, viz. between
what is said and one’s saying of it, lies at the heart of Cavell’s conserva-
tive attitude towards pragmatic implication.
What does any of this have to do with rule-descriptions and categorial
declaratives? According to Cavell, rule-descriptions, such as S, tell us that
it is part of the meaning of certain words or phrases that we imply cer-
tain things in their utterance. The following question then arises: how
do we figure out what these implications are? Cavell has both a negative
and a positive answer to give: the first is ‘not by conducting any kind of
poll’, while the second is to ‘look to native speakers’. But these jointly
give rise to a further question: ’why not poll native speakers?’
An alien statistician may well want to do this. But while not infallible,
a native speaker has no need to poll other native speakers to know the
meaning of the ordinary words she uses. To know the meaning of a
word or phrase is to have internalised (i.e., be able to follow) the rule-
descriptions that reveal what is being said when the word is employed,
viz. what is meant by the word or phrase in question. Cavell calls the
’rule-descriptions’ in question ’categorial declaratives’. This is in order to
highlight (via allusion to Kant’s categorical imperatives) what he takes to
be their peculiar form: they are neither synthetic nor analytic statements;
they describe neither necessary nor contingent truths and are not known
either a priori or a posteriori.
Cavell’s term ‘rule-descriptions’ is intended to suggest that the rules
are definitive of their object: any activities that fall under them are logi-
cally dependent upon them. Such rules are akin to what John Rawls
denominates ‘practice rules’ (and would later become known as ‘consti-
tutive rules’).46 So understood, ‘rule-descriptions’ are more like the rules
of chess than the (merely regulative) rules of cooking, pertaining to
activities that are logically independent of them. If you break a rule of
chess (e.g., ‘the bishop only moves diagonally’), then you are not so
much playing bad chess as not playing chess at all (at best, you are play-




46. See Cavell (2002:29-30, n.27); Cf. Midgley (1959). The origins of rule-constitutivism
lie with Wittgenstein (for an overview of his remarks, and the point at which the chess/
language analogy breaks down, see Gustafsson 2019).
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will most likely end up cooking badly, rather than not at all (unless you
misunderstand ‘grease the bottom of the pan’).47
But Cavell simultaneously allows that some rules are more like the
rules of cooking than the rules of chess. Such ‘standards’ or ‘maxims’
specify how to do a thing well, rather than what it takes to do it tout
court. Cavell’s question, ‘[w]hen is not doing a thing well not really
doing the thing?’48, is deeply intertwined with that of whether we must
mean what we say. Just as the line between poor cooking and no cook-
ing can be crossed in certain instances of breaking the same rule, so too
with the line between poor communication and no communication at
all. When I mean to suggest that something raises a new question and do
so by saying ‘this begs the question. . .’, am I saying what I mean, saying
something different from what I meant to say, or not really saying any-
thing at all? More importantly, who gets to decide and on what basis?49
Some rules, then, would seem to have both regulative and descriptive
applications, whereas others only have the former. A rule such as ’no
picnic’ on a park sign, for example, is a purely regulative norm. In
breaking it, you make it true that a picnic is taking place in the park.
And the picnic in itself is not a defective one for being forbidden. By
contrast, if you fail to pre-heat the oven before you bake your bread,
then you are not baking well, and if you never heat the oven you are
not baking at all. Similarly, the rules of grammar will divide between
those whose flouting leads to (i) poor prose, (ii) saying something differ-
ent from what one meant to say and (iii) not saying anything at all. The
term ‘rule-description’ serves to highlight Cavell’s interest in (iii). The
rules of chess and language are thus said to ‘describe’ how the (chess or
language) game is to be played. It muddies the waters, however, because
rules themselves are not descriptive of anything. Rather, the same string
of words (e.g., ‘bishops only move diagonally’) may be used to both state
a rule and describe how the game of chess is to be played. In the latter
case, our uttering of ‘the rules’ serves as shorthand for a description of
what the rules are (e.g., ‘the rule for bishops is that they only move
diagonally’). The latter, but not the former, is a statement that may be
either true or false.
This arguably explains why Cavell finds statements such as ’S’ impos-
sible to classify and why he is consequently puzzled regarding the kind
of statement a ’rule-description’ is. If by ’rule-description’ we mean a
description (or account) of what the rule is, then such things are syn-
thetic judgements with a truth value. By contrast, rules themselves – be
47. I owe this example to Julia Tanney.
48. Cavell (2002:29).
49. My thanks to Matt Dougherty for pushing me on these matters.
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they constitutive or regulative – are not truth-apt.50 Ryle’s claims about
what is ‘voluntary’, as well as Cavell’s own offering of ‘S’, are not rules
but (in my view, false) statements about what the rule in question is.
When Cavell writes that ’there is no way to classify’ statements about
ordinary language because they are neither synthetic nor analytic (etc.), it
would thus be charitable to understand him as using ’rule-description’ or
’categorial declarative’ to refer to the rule itself.
Cavell here makes a final, and intriguing, distinction:
[T]he philosopher who proceeds from ordinary language is "establishing
a norm" [. . .] He is certainly not instituting norms, nor is he ascertaining
norms.51
He tells us characteristically little about how he conceives of the differ-
ences between these three activities involving norms, and whether any
of them amounts to that of following a rule. The word ’establish’ seems to
fall somewhere between ’ascertain’ and ’institute’. Ascertaining something
– including a norm – is to try to find (or figure) something out. Here,
the implication is that we do so by examining the evidence. To institute
a norm, by contrast, is to originate and establish it, whether through
instant stipulation or repeated use. This is the dream of every conceptual
engineer. In philosophy, however, this at best leads to the creation of
jargon.
The OLP philosopher, we are told, neither ascertains not institutes
norms. She rather establishes them. Many dictionaries offer ’institute’ as a
synonym for ’establish’. But there is also a use of ’establish’ that is closer
to that of ’ascertaining’. Perhaps Cavell is using the word ’establish’ to
indicate that the OLP philosopher attempts to settle debates, as in ’estab-
lish once and for all’. If so, then the OLP philosopher establishes what
the norm is. Establishing, so conceived, is not something one does to a
norm directly, as in the case of instituting. It is true that norms themselves
become established through repeated use, but it is not the job of the OLP
philosopher to establish them in this sense. Establishing what (once estab-
lished) the norm is, by contrast, runs parallel to ascertaining. For, ’ascer-
taining norms’ can only really mean ascertaining what the norms are.
The difference is that ’ascertain’ implies evidence-based discovery,
though perhaps this implicature is cancellable. Cavell’s exploration stops
short of establishing what the norms surrounding the use of the words
’ascertain’ and ’establish’ are, but by the latter he seems to have some-
thing like ‘ascertaining without evidence’ in mind.52
50. See Baker and Hacker (2009:II & VII).
51. Cavell (2002:29), emphasis in original.
52. Matt Dougherty has suggested to me that this might be similar to Cavell’s later
phrase, ‘finding as founding’ (Cavell 2013:77).
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Does Cavell think of OLP as establishing what the norms are, or as
establishing norms, viz. setting them up? The latter seems too close to
instituting, and Cavell has good reason to state that the philosopher is cer-
tainly not doing that, since each OLP philosopher would be free to insti-
tute her own norms (insofar as one can do such a thing at all in
isolation). It seems charitable, then, to assume that he means something
closer to establishing what the norms are. But this is not in itself a
method because one can establish things in different ways. Indeed, one
way of establishing what the norms are would, presumably, be by ascer-
taining what they are.
We would do better, then, to read Cavell as asserting that fluent
speakers qua ordinary language philosophers establish what the norms are
in a sense connected to their being a source of evidence. The fluent
speaker is not in the business of finding out the meaning of everyday
words, because she already knows what they mean. What she is trying to
do is bring this knowledge into the correct light.53
IV. Experiments in Language
Cavell’s paper landed like a jar of Marmite. V.C. Chappell referred to it
as ’[t]he most detailed explanation and defence of the procedures of ordi-
nary language philosophy that has yet appeared’.54 Fodor and Katz
reached the mirror opposite conclusion:
The position Cavell advocates [. . .] seems [. . .] to be mistaken in every
significant respect and to be pernicious both for an adequate under-
standing of ordinary language philosophy and for an adequate under-
standing of ordinary language.55
The latter were right to criticise Cavell’s claim that the baker who uses
’inadvertently’ and ’automatically’ interchangeably fails to notice some-
thing about the world.56 But in conflating use with usage throughout
their paper, Fodor and Katz fail to notice something of philosophical
importance. They also make the additional mistake of thinking that
sequences of words such as ‘my name is not Stanley Cavell’ are ‘clearly
empirical’ statements,57 as opposed to, say, non-propositional hinge cer-
tainties.58 This all leads them to offering their readers an uninspired
53. See Wittgenstein (PI, §109) and Hanfling (2000:57-8).
54. Chappell (1964:4); cf. Laugier (2011).
55. Fodor & Katz (1963:57); cf. Alson (1962).
56. Fodor & Katz (1963:68).
57. Ibid.:64.
58. Cf. Moyal-Sharrock (2007, esp. chs. 2-4).
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choice between ‘empirical investigation’ and ‘transcendental logic’.59
There are more things in OLP than are dreamt of in this philosophy.
While the debate was eventually left behind without being ‘won’ by
either side, Fodor’s ’language of thought’ hypothesis would gain promi-
nence at the expense of OLP. While the latter receded from mainstream
analytic philosophy during the final quarter of the 20th century, Cavell’s
work would nonetheless give rise to a whole new wave of concern with
the ordinary, from James Conant and Cora Diamond to more recent
proponents such as Avnar Baz and Toril Moi.60
Fast-forward to the 21st century, experimental philosophy has become
a bona fide (albeit highly controversial) area of philosophical practice. Its
target now is not simply OLP, but any form of armchair conceptual phi-
losophy, from Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore to David Lewis and
Frank Jackson. These disparate methodologies are sometimes brought
together under the familiar term ’conceptual analysis’, despite the fact
that many practitioners of conceptual elucidation and conceptual cartog-
raphy are explicitly against conceptual analysis.61 X-Phi arguments vary
slightly from one experimental philosopher to another, but the following
statements are typical of mainstream attacks on conceptual analysis:
[T]he conceptual analyst might write “in this cas, one would surely
say...,” while the experimental philosopher would write, “in this case,
79% of subjects said...”’ and back her claims with statistical data.62
[A]reas of philosophy that rely on [. . .] conceptual analysis based in
part on ordinary usage [. . .] are ripe for investigation by experimental
philosophers [. . .] examining these things in a controlled and systematic
way [. . .] there is a shared distrust of philosophers’ (common) claims of
the general form [. . .] ‘The ordinary use of “X” is Y’, [. . .] based upon
armchair reflection on their own intuitions and (perhaps selective) con-
sideration of their conversations with friends, family, and especially stu-
dents [. . .] methods [. . .] highly susceptible to well-known biases.63
In the empirical spirit, I should report that, when I typed the phrase
“it would be natural to say” into Google’s Book Search, it happily
returned, as its top search results, passages by Gilbert Ryle, Peter Straw-
son, Max Black and Bertrand Russell.64
The above claims contain a number of confusions, including the confla-
tion of use with usage, and the misguided thought that linguistic philoso-
phy done from the figurative armchair must rely on intuitions.65 Given
59. Fodor & Katz (1963:71).
60. See Baz (2012 & Baz 2017) and Moi (2017).
61. E.g., Sandis (2010: §2) and Tanney (2013).
62. Knobe & Nichols (2008:4).
63. Naddelhoffer & Nahmias (2007:125).
64. Appiah (2008:VI).
65. See note 12, above.
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how strikingly similar these worries are to the empirical semantics com-
plaint against OLP, it seems prudent to assess the extent to which
Cavell’s original arguments might still be applicable. In this, I am in
agreement with Hansen, although our interpretations of Cavell’s argu-
ments and, a fortiori, our assessment of their precise relevance, differ.66
Cavell’s argument hinges on the thought that the OLP is in no need
of evidence because she can establish what the norms are simply in virtue
of being a ’native’ speaker. Such establishing does not rely on intuition
but on the mastery of ’grammatical’ rules one learns in becoming (what I
would call) a fluent speaker. The fact that such mastery is neither instant,
nor infallible,67 does not render it an intuition. While a philosopher of
any stripe might (explicitly or otherwise) find themselves appealing to
intuition, there is no particular reason why OLPs need do so. The evi-
dence/intuition dichotomy is false: one philosopher may correct another
by appealing to neither, e.g., when one brings a momentarily neglected
use to another’s attention. Philosophers are not appealing to intuition
when they recall ordinary uses that we neglect when in the grip of a pic-
ture or a concept that leaves no space for them,68 or when they show
how a number of seemingly diverse uses are more closely related to one
another than we had previously supposed.
A philosopher may also elucidate concepts with helpful examples from
literature, decent dictionaries (fallible though they remain),69 and other
reminders of ’what we say’ in everyday language; these can even be
sought by putting terms and phrases in search engines (without quite
getting up from our armchairs). By so distinguishing between correct
and incorrect uses of terms and phrases, fluent speakers may improve
their grasp of any given concept.70 Such things can also play an eviden-
tial role in certain disputes71 (e.g., when playing Scrabble). Still, our
everyday ability to speak does not depend upon its confirmation. In
sum, while evidence can be sought and provided, fluent speakers do not
ordinarily ground their claims about use on it; it therefore tends to serve
as a reminder, rather than as a ground.
There are further debates to be had here, e.g., about the value of the
metaphor of so-called family resemblance.72 For present purposes, how-
ever, what matters is that native/fluent speakers stand to be corrected by
66. See Hansen (2017).
67. See Henle (1957:218-9) and Longworth (2018:10-11).
68. Wittgenstein (PI, §127 & BT, §419).
69. Henry Jackman goes further in writing that ‘[e]ven the OED can be ignored with
impunity in many quarters’ (Jackman 2001:321), but gives no examples.
70. On the relation of the everyday to the ordinary, see Ryle (1953:314-18).
71. Many thanks to Baptiste Cornardeau for pushing me on this point.
72. See Beardsmore (1992).
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other such speakers by recognising the validity of various counterexam-
ples.
While linguistic and conceptual norms are ’rules of grammar’, state-
ments about them are standard empirical claims that can be backed up by
evidence, although the source of that evidence will ultimately be native
speakers themselves. The term ‘rule-description’ seems to hover between
the two. Likewise, Cavell’s distinction between three types of statement
made about ordinary language (instances, explications and generalisa-
tions73) muddies the water in ignoring the difference between expres-
sions of a rule and statements about what the rule in question is alleged
to be.
When Cavell maintains S, viz. that something is only voluntary if
there is an implication of fishiness, we can respond by pointing to cases
where we would naturally say that something is voluntary, without
implying anything of the kind. Here, the source of the evidence really is
native speakers themselves, and not something that exists independently
of them.
V. Epilogue
In a recent article, Hansen objects to similar defences of OLP in the fol-
lowing way:
Some recent defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy
rely on versions of the conventionalist response to Mates that sidestep
worries about idiolects by assuming that certain practitioners of ordi-
nary language philosophy have access to "objective facts about linguistic
norms." For example, Sandis (2010) distinguishes ordinary language
philosophy from recent experimental investigations of topics of philo-
sophical interest by claiming that ordinary language philosophy makes
observations about “proper linguistic usage” and “legitimate use.”74
But the sort of conventionalism I espouse, according to which linguistic
norms are shared arbitrary rules,75 does not put any OLP practitioner in
73. Cavell (2002:3).
74. Hansen (2017:9). See also Hansen & Chemla (2015).
75. A much fuller defence is provided by Glock (2008; 2010). As Christopher Winch
(1988) argues, such conventions arise naturally and are not be confused with David Lewis’
account of the conventionality of language as the result of an effort to solve co-ordination
problems (Lewis 1969). For conventionalism in relation to Carnap, Quine, and Sellars see
Westphal (2015).
© 2021 The Authors. Philosophical Investigations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
16 Philosophical Investigations
a position of privilege above other fluent speakers.76 The general reality
of linguistic agreement is hardly a privilege of some chosen few.77
Hansen is nonetheless right to spot a tension between my appeal to
’facts about linguistic norms’ and Cavell’s insistence that the OLP
philosopher is not in the business of ascertaining norms. The tension exists
because it is natural to infer that such facts are things to be ascertained
from evidence. But the possibility of their being ascertained in this way
is compatible with its typically making no sense for fluent speakers to
proceed this way (just as I don’t normally ascertain that my name is
Constantine through the consideration of evidence). Thus, while I see
the tension as being largely rhetorical, Hansen’s interpretation of Cavell
renders him far more radical and anti-conventionalist. He writes:
[I]f my interpretation of Cavell is correct, then Cavell should be seen
as rejecting Mates’s starting assumption and insisting that there is a cen-
tral normative component to the statements of the ordinary language
philosophers – statements about what we say are not just descriptions,
they are proposals as to how words should be used statements about
what we say are not just descriptions, they are proposals as to how
words should be used.78
Understood thus, a categorial declarative is only successful when it comes
to be accepted by one’s intended audience. As a reconstruction
of Cavell, this fails to do justice to his remark that categorial declaratives
do not ‘institute’ norms.79 I have tried to show that we would do better
to understand Cavell as suggesting that the ordinary language philosopher
is in the business of establishing what the relevant norms are. After all,
statements such as ’S’ are not being offered as alternatives to current ordi-
nary use. Be that as it may, we both contend that Cavell denies that
statements about what we say are descriptions of popular usage and that
he is right to do so. Pari passu, there is a sense in which he thinks that
statements about what we say (such as ’S’) are proposals about how
words should be used. But ’should’ here just means that there is such a
thing as misusing a word. Cavell is no conceptual engineer in the con-
temporary sense80. Proposals regarding how words should be used are to
76. The ‘authoritative status’ worry is also raised by Jackman (2001:320-24). But the
OLP need not (and, indeed, should not) allege that she is more of an expert on what ‘we’
would say than any other fluent speaker. Her skills are elucidatory and cartographic, not
epistemic (see Tanney 2013).
77. See Midgley (1959). For appeals to fact, evidence, and intuition in the case of moral
conventions see Sandis (2019b).
78. Hansen (2017:17); cf. Henle (1957:752), who thinks that ’what is involved is primar-
ily a matter of reaching a decision’.
79. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for making this connection.
80. See Westphal (2021: §3.3) for how this differs from Carnap’s more conventionalist
understanding of ‘language engineering’.
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be grounded on facts about correct use, e.g., that claiming one is ‘beg-
ging the question’ is to say that they are already assuming the truth of
what is being argued for.
Where does all this leave experimental philosophy? On Hansen’s
assessment:
the answer to the question must we measure what we mean? – when that
is taken as a question about the need to survey how speakers of the
language actually speak when making claims about what we mean by
the use of an expression – is no, but it is extremely difficult to make a
compelling proposal about the meaning of an expression that ignores
evidence about how the expression is in fact used. Citing experimental
(or corpus-based) evidence of a distinction in use can be an effective
way of convincing an audience that a particular difference in meaning
exists and can play a powerful rhetorical role in producing the
acknowledgement necessary for a successful categorial declarative.81
On the first question, I am in agreement with Hansen. However, we
agree for different reasons, and this leads us to answer the second ques-
tion very differently. Experimental evidence may inform us of majority
and minority usage. In addition, it can point an audience to a particular
overlooked difference in use, thereby serving as a reminder that assists us
in establishing linguistic norms. But in this, it is no different from news-
papers, literature, search engine results, and other fluent speakers.
Accordingly, experimental philosophy should not place itself in competi-
tion with OLP, but at its service. The service it can offer, however, is
pretty limited.82
81. Hansen (2017:24).
82. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful feedback. This paper began life as
an introduction to a discussion of Cavell’s paper at the 53rd Session of the Welsh Philosoph-
ical Society (Gregynog Hall, 28-30 April 2017). Paper versions were subsequently presented
at Natural and Formal Languages (Univsity of Zurich, 6-9 December 2017), Wittgenstein:
Grammar and Nature (University of Southampton, 9th July 2018), and Seminaire Wittgenstein
2019-2020: Retour de la Philosophie du Langage Ordinaire (Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sor-
bonne, 1st Feb, 2020). I am deeply grateful to Matt Dougherty and Baptiste Cornardeau,
who were my respondants at Southampton and Paris respectively; their detailed comments
saved me from many errors. I would also like to thank Louise Chapman, Andrew Lugg,
Ken Westphal, and Peter Winslow, as well as the organisers and participants of the above-
mentioned events, particularly Jason Bridges, Christiane Chauvire, David Cockburn,
Pierre Fasula, Hanjo Glock, Felix Hagenstr€om, Tim Kjeldsen, Hugh Knott, Sandra Lau-
gier, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Fionn O’Donovan, Naomi Scheman, Nicole Rathgeb, Ste-
fan Riegelnik, Genia Schoenbaumsfeld, and Roger Teichmann.
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